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Hungary on the Greek way 
 
Another EU country joins the PIIGS club of economic disaster 
 
 
Hungary had a leadership role in the 1990s amongst Eastern European countries in terms of political and 
economic development towards democracy and market capitalism. Back then the country was eminent in 
terms of socio-economic transition from state socialism towards market capitalism, adopting the Western 
model of living and thinking seemingly the fastest from the group of countries often referred as “New 
Europe”. The development culminated at the end of the decade: Hungary along with the Czech Republic 
and Poland was in the first group of the NATO enlargement in 1999, and also in the first group of the EU 
enlargement in 2004. Back then the future looked bright, the country was on the way to introduce the 
Euro as early as 2007, meeting all the needed economic criteria. 
 
What has happened since then is a different kind of story. As the privatization of the previously 100% 
state owned economy together with different austerity measures in the mid-90s moved the country onto 
the right and sustainable track of economic development, the country produced 4-5% GDP growth yearly 
in the late-90s. This prospect of “welfare” gave birth to a richer state which started to extend higher 
benefits to its citizens during the early 2000s. And this is exactly where things went wrong. Due to 
political populism and the overestimation of the country's growth prospects governments started to spend 
far beyond their capabilities, making huge deficits and a rapidly growing debt. Although decision makers 
were well-informed about economic facts, the fierce political competition between the country's political 
parties for power did not allow space for economic maneuvering and for new austerity measures. Only 
spending more and promising to spend even more was imaginable. Soon this downward economic spiral 
led the country to something we could call “the death of the early-born welfare state.” 
 
As early as 2008 the country faced its second IMF bailout, because its debt reached a non-sustainable 
level and the risk of economic collapse was higher than ever. (The first IMF bailout of Hungary was in 
1982, due to very similar reasons but in a very different political environment. That time the economic 
weakness of the country forced it to open up westwards, which can be seen now as a positive step.) With 
the IMF loan short-term stability returned, and bankruptcy was avoidable, but together with the loan came 
the conditions which required new austerity measures and far less spending from the government, which 
had no way to avoid these measures in the new situation and had to execute them. 
 
 
At this point we reach the original sources of the current crisis of the country. The austerity measures had 
their political price: the socialist government which implemented them under IMF pressure in 2008-09 
lost the elections in 2010 in such a way that the opposing nationalist party got a two thirds majority in the 
parliament making them able to form a government practically without any possible obstruction from 
their opponents. (In the Hungarian political system a two thirds majority in the parliament can give a 
government  almost  absolute  power,  since  it  is  enough  to  change  all  the  important  laws,  even  the 
constitution.)  With  such  a  power  at  hand  one  could  imagine  that  the  way  opened  up  for  the  new 
government to put the country back on track, and give the economy a healthy restart. Theoretically this 
could have happened, but in reality the power of populism is even stronger than the power of a two-thirds 
government. Learning from the brutal loss of their opponents, the new government made austerity a taboo 
word, and the IMF shortly became the country's main enemy. IMF conditions were seen through the 
populist eyes of the new government as colonial tools to keep Hungary under foreign rule, and Hungary 
begun its “war of economic independence.”   
 
The first step was to get rid of the IMF assistance as soon as possible to make the country be able to 
maneuver freely, and to start spending again at the cost of a rising debt. The IMF was “sent home” by 4 
 
2010, but fortunately the rise of the debt was so strictly forbidden by the EU that even the two-thirds of 
the government had to comply. After the first attempt to spend more failed, the government did not give 
up, and begun what we call now “unorthodox economic policy.” The core element of this policy is quite 
easy to describe: get as many financial resources to the government's hands as possible from inside the 
country  since  the  outside  resources  (debt  financing  and  the  IMF)  are  gone.  The  unorthodox  policy 
contains the following steps until now: a huge bank tax together with other anti-capital measures, the 
elimination  of  the  private  pension  funds  and  taking  the  savings  back  to  the  state,  food  tax  on  the 
unhealthy products, elimination of the beneficial “easy taxation system” for small businesses, and several 
other new tax forms coming on the way. The biggest change among these policies was the pension funds 
overtake, which helped to avoid bankruptcy in 2011 but as it was only a one-time possibility it will not 
help in the future. The other measures taken could make a better government fiscal balance on the short 
term, but on the long term they are only demotivating the enterprises in the country and slowing the 
already miserable GDP growth, which impacts the government with even smaller tax revenues. 
 
And here we reach the current crisis of Hungary which comes increasingly visible in the last few months. 
As international investors and rating agencies follow closely the Hungarian developments of nowadays 
they come more and more to the same conclusion as above. The one time savior belt of the pension funds 
cannot give protection to the government balance forever, and Hungary already finds it hard to finance 
itself  from  the  markets  as  the  latest  bond-auctions  were  unsuccessful.  These  negative  developments 
projected to the future can give rise to worries and rumors on international markets that the country will 
default on  its  debt  as  early  as  this  summer.  Mark  Gongloff  of the Wall  Street Journal  quotes  RBC 
emerging-markets analysts saying that the tipping point is near for Hungary: 
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“Trends in Hungary are becoming quite concerning and dynamics suggest Hungary may be approaching a 
crisis sometime soon. Today’s poor 12 month Tbill auction is a window into the financial pressures 
building in Hungary. … 
The weak demand in short-term government debt offerings suggests that refinancing risks are rising and 
certainly the cost has soared over the past couple of months. Most emerging markets have shaken off the 
old destabilizing forces of the past and have been able to guide rates lower when global growth has 
slowed. However, in Hungary’s case this is still a dynamic which, born of its unbalanced policies, results 
in Hungary’s becoming caught in a vicious cycle when global economic/financial conditions deteriorate. 
A rating downgrade, in our opinion, is becoming likely and tail-risk events… are becoming much more 
probable of materializing in coming days/weeks.” 
 
While  David  Keohane  of  the  Financial  Times  writes  more  openly,  assuming  “tail-risk  events”  as  a 
possible default without the IMF's help:
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“Fitch revised Hungary’s rating outlook to negative on Friday night, reminding investors of the very real 
possibility that the big three ratings agencies will downgrade the country’s debt to junk in the very near 
future. 
... 
A full ratings downgrade is imminent. Soon after Fitch’s Friday night announcement, S&P also put the 
county on a negative outlook. S&P also rates Hungary BBB-. Citi argued in a note on Monday that 
Hungary might have the reserves to cover debt maturities and its fiscal deficit until about mid-2012 but 
that without the availability of market funding the government would have to turn to the IMF or start QE 
at significant sizes by the second half of 2012. Based on the political rhetoric, we believe Hungarian 
assets would have to suffer sharper devaluation before the government changes its unwelcoming attitude 
towards the IMF.” 
 
                                                           
1  http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2011/11/10/hungary-the-next-european-crisis/  
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The  more  and  more  obvious  signs  of  economic  weakness  already  raised  serious  concerns  amongst 
international investors: The CDS level of Hungary hit a record  high in late October 2011, and has not 
decreased ever since. The several unsuccessful bond-auctions in the last few months forced the country to 
raise bond rates to record high levels as well, and now the rates are even higher then Italy's. 
 
CDS level of Hungary (USD):
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Another serious sign of weakness is the HUF/EUR rate, which hit a record high of 317  in November, 
which is closely similar to the level of the 2008 debt crisis times, and means a huge devaluation of the 
country's currency:
4 
As it looks now, the populist “war for economic independence” comes soon to its end in Hungary with 
the IMF's third bailout more and more unavoidable. The question is only what costs it will take this time: 
                                                           
3  http://hedgefund.blog.hu/2011/10/10/a_hedge_fund_ok_magyarorszag_ellen  
4  http://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=EUR&to=HUF  6 
 
if the government fights until its last breath it will harm the economy not only inside the country, but 
possibly Europe- and world-wide as well. Is Hungary following the Greek example? Let's hope not: the 
latest news from the country indicate the government's intention to re-engage with the IMF, which would 
be the wisest thing to do in the current situation, and the sharp drop at the end of the second graph shows 
that  this  intention  already  has  given  the  HUF  market  some  confidence.  But  until  this  intention 
materializes  as  an  official  agreement  between  the  parties  (which  could  take  a  long  time  given  the 
government's anti-IMF sentiment), the question of fatal destabilization is still pending. 
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